A COLLISION COURSE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
SOCIAL INCLUSION
AND
THE POLITICS OF MAORI SELF-DETERMINATION

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Abstract

As a Third Way politics concerned with combating ‘social exclusion’ has gathered interest around the world, the concept of ‘social inclusion’ has been applied to indigenous peoples living within ‘settler’ societies. Using indigenous Māori in New Zealand as an example, this paper argues that the framing of internally-colonised peoples by a social inclusion discourse is highly problematic. Claims that social inclusion for Māori can be achieved through ‘community empowerment’, ‘capacity building’ ‘partnership’ and ‘active citizenship’ have assumed that Māori ‘needs’ can be met within the universal citizenship rights of the ‘nation-state’. Yet, some calls for Māori self-determination incorporate a power-sharing or parallel development dimension that proposes strategic ‘exclusion’ from mainstream institutions and state-framed notions of citizenship that regard ‘nation’ and ‘state’ as irrevocably tied. Indeed, such proposals assert that two or more nations can exist within one political state. Hidden by overlaps in the language used to promote government’s commitment to Māori and a new ‘social development’ approach to social policy, this tension between social inclusion and Māori self-determination has not been clear in the New Zealand case. As a result, the rights that Māori hold as both indigenous peoples and partners in the Treaty of Waitangi have continued to be marginalised.
INTRODUCTION

Social inclusion and its nemesis, social exclusion, have become key concerns of many governments around the world, particularly those influenced by what has come to be regarded as a ‘Third Way’ politics. The international drift of these concepts has seen understandings of them evolve, yet there has been little (if at all) explicit consideration of their suitability given crucial differences in the socio-political contexts and relations that range from one country or hemisphere to another. Of particular note, is the way in which notions of social inclusion and exclusion have been adopted and applied universally to all disadvantaged peoples in settler societies, with a seeming lack of awareness or willingness to acknowledge that these concepts marginalise the unique rights and needs of indigenous peoples living within settler states. This marginalization occurs because, although some of the solutions they promote may overlap, social inclusion and proposals for indigenous self-determination are based on fundamentally different interpretations of the ‘problem’.

This paper explores such an argument by deconstructing a discourse of social inclusion/exclusion from a perspective that takes into account the needs and rights of indigenous peoples. The way in which the concepts of social inclusion/exclusion have evolved since the 1970s is considered and a broad definition of what these terms have meant in particular social policy contexts offered. Given that policy initiatives based on social inclusion/exclusion vary within different socio-political contexts, it is difficult to assert with some certainty that the application of a discourse of inclusion/exclusion is problematic for all indigenous peoples, as it has been for Māori in New Zealand.

Nonetheless, using the New Zealand case as an example, it is possible to consider three key tensions that exist when the concepts of social inclusion/exclusion are applied to indigenous peoples. First, it is argued that artificial boundaries between the socially included and excluded are constructed through a social inclusion/exclusion discourse. This results in the structural power relations, such as those relating to ‘race’, ethnicity, gender and age, affecting both the included and excluded to be largely ignored. In addition, the polarization of the included and excluded tends to portray each of these groups as homogenous, ignoring the diversity contained within each. Particular focus is placed on the way in which a social inclusion/exclusion discourse does not engage with the particular power inequalities that exist between the state and indigenous peoples, with the ‘capacity building’ and ‘partnership’ initiatives applied to Māori providing evidence for this contention.

Second, it is argued that a social inclusion/exclusion discourse tends to normalize the socially included and the majority group norms and values that they embody, having the effect of redoubling the exclusion of disadvantaged peoples. In illustrating this argument, the paper considers the notion of social capital, the development of which is regarded as a key means for achieving social inclusion, and the way in which it reflects western liberal assumptions that do not account for the vastly different cultural experiences of Māori. In addition, the moral agendas behind a social inclusion/exclusion discourse are discussed, with special emphasis on the coercive means that have been adopted to encourage disadvantaged peoples into conformity.
with majority group norms and values, resulting in a reinterpretation of citizenship which is conditional on such conformity.

Third, it is contended that a social inclusion/exclusion discourse fails to fully account for individuals and groups to choose self-exclusion. Particular focus is placed on the way in which the linking of social inclusion with citizenship through national identity is highly problematic for Māori who have long called for a form of strategic exclusion that would allow greater levels of self-determination, including proposals for parallel development and power-sharing between the state and Māori at the ‘national’ level.

In concluding that applying a social inclusion/exclusion discourse to Māori creates (or, perhaps more correctly, maintains) significant conceptual tensions in a social policy context, the paper highlights the risks of applying a Third Way political discourse that developed out of continental Europe and Great Britain in the vastly different socio-political context of New Zealand. Social policy ‘solutions’ for indigenous peoples should not be founded on whatever conceptual discourse happens to be popular at the time; the wholesale adoption of neo-liberal economic rationalism should have already taught us this lesson, particularly given that the negative effects of deregulation, corporatisation and privatization hit indigenous peoples disproportionately in comparison to non-indigenous populations. Rather, social policy needs to be developed in consultation with indigenous peoples, so that the ‘problems’ of concern to them are clarified and ‘solutions’ developed that account for the specific needs and rights they embody as ‘first peoples’.

The evolution of social inclusion/exclusion

A problem inherent to any discussion of social inclusion/exclusion is that these concepts have undergone several shifts in interpretation over the past three decades and across varying geographical locations as they have been implemented by governments of differing political persuasions. Following a brief historical overview of this genesis, a broad definition of what ‘social inclusion/exclusion’ entails within a variety of social policy contexts is provided. Such clarity is a vital tool for understanding the origins of the concepts of social inclusion/exclusion, which is clearly located in a western liberal and historical tradition that is vastly different from and fail to account for the specific needs and rights of indigenous peoples living in settler societies.

‘Social exclusion’ as a concept originally developed out of the French context in 1974 (Briar 2000:22). The term ‘exclusion sociale’ in the French policy milieu referred to a very select set of categories of people who were excluded from the provision of social insurance in France, which had traditionally been offered only to those in paid work or legally married to someone in paid work. There were ten specific groups or categories deemed to be ‘excluded’: the physically and mentally handicapped; those who were ‘suicidal’; aged invalids; abused children; substance abusers; delinquents; single parents(mothers); multi-problem households (those that presented more than one of these factors at one time); ‘marginals’; ‘asocials’; and ‘social misfits’(Peace 2001:19). French policy documents thus referred to exclusions in the plural, capturing the multi-dimensionality of the original concept which included economic, political and social aspects (Briar 2000:22).
During 1980s and 1990s, the idea of social exclusion spread through continental Europe, achieving prominence in European Commission and European Union (EU) deliberations, as well as the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation. Partly a ‘branding exercise’ for the EU’s highly controversial Poverty Policy Programmes (Briar 2000:22; Peace 2001:18), European understandings of social exclusion were influenced by the fact that the fifteen EU member states shared a primarily economic relationship. This made it difficult to rationalize the incorporation of social policy initiatives into the broader mandate of EU policy and, as a result, ‘anti-poverty’ programmes tended to be coupled with ‘employment’ initiatives wherever they could (Peace 2001:19-20). Some continental European states also placed requirements on welfare recipients, obligating them to take up training and to look for a job (Hunter 2000:3). The issue of social, rather than just economic cohesion, did come to the fore with negotiations around the Maastricht Treaty. Nonetheless, Percy-Smith (2000:2-3) notes that during the mid-1990s social exclusion became conflated more and more with exclusion from the labour market in the continental European context (Briar 2000:23-24).

Social exclusion entered the field of English-speaking policy analysis and development studies more generally when it became a central platform of Blair’s New Labour government in the United Kingdom during the mid-1990s (Harris and Williams 2003:206). The concept of social exclusion was adopted as an attempt to reject traditional analyses of social problems in terms of structural cleavages, such as social class, so that the focus could be shifted more to the needs and demands of particular individuals and minority groups (Taylor-Gooby 2000:336). There was, however, a move away from the continental European notion of social exclusion as about the obligations of governments or society making amends for being an excluding agent towards an emphasis on individual culpability and the single dimension of exclusion from paid work (Briar 2000:23-24; Percy-Smith 2000:3; Peace 2001:21-22). Blair’s form of social democracy was far more market-oriented than many countries in continental Europe and Scandinavia, such as the Dutch, Swedish and French (Merkel 2001). This has led some commentators (e.g. Thomson 2000) to suggest that Blair’s ‘Third Way’, which aimed to set a middle path between the extremes of neo-liberalism and traditional social-democracy, leaned more towards the former at the expense of the latter.

Connected to this shift was an increasing use of the term ‘social inclusion’ (to describe the goal), as well as social exclusion (the ‘problem’) (Department of Social Security 1999:3). Social inclusion was broadly defined as solidarity and the incorporation of citizens more successfully into society (see Briar 2000:23). However, in practice, the Blair government stated that “the best way to avoid poverty and social exclusion is to be in paid work” (Department of Social Security 1999:9). Thus, the goal of social inclusion was used to promote ‘New Deals’ for the unemployed, lone parents and disabled which were heavily influenced by punitive welfare reforms made in the United States since 1996. Burden and Hamm (2000:191) argue that this greater focus on labour market entry, the rejection of dependency and attempts to control the behaviour of the ‘excluded’, indicate that New Labour viewed social inclusion as an aspect of social cohesion rather than of economic and social equality. However, this emphasis on paid work sat alongside: social investment in education, health and housing; community empowerment through new funding for programmes to support
the regeneration of poor neighbourhoods and partnerships between the central and local governments, business, the voluntary sector and individuals; and a ‘joined up’ approach across government departments (Department of Social Security 1999:4-5; Percy-Smith 2000:2-3; Daly and Smith 2002:1).

By the time the time a social exclusion/inclusion discourse had moved from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere in the late 1990s, the focus was far less on the ‘problem’ (social exclusion) and more on ‘solutions’ said to facilitate social inclusion. In Australia, for example, the Howard government adopted the notion of social inclusion to justify mutual obligation and community participation programs at the local level which were similar to those seen in Britain and the United States (Harris and Williams 2003:206). In New Zealand, Blair’s New Labour government and its Third Way politics heavily influenced the centre-left Labour-Alliance coalition government elected to power in 1999 after nine years in Opposition. Thus, aims to improve social inclusion participation largely focused on labour market and economic activity and the integration of social and economic policy has resulted in social policy increasingly being tied to economic objectives (McMillan 2002:4). With social inclusion tied to ‘self-reliance’, ‘reciprocity’ and ‘mutual obligation’ initiatives that acted as a punitive measure for those deemed ‘undeserving’ of security payments, the moral agendas behind a discourse of exclusion and inclusion have been very explicit in the Southern Hemisphere (see Peace 2001:30). A focus on the ‘deserving’ subject has moved social policy debates away from concern with the needs and rights attached to citizenship towards citizen participation being an obligation with only those individuals who conform by being in or seeking paid work (McMillan 2002:4;8).

This shift has been all the more problematic given that the Labour-Alliance coalition attempted to blend the newly-embraced social inclusion/exclusion discourse with rhetoric about the rights to self-determination that Māori hold as indigenous peoples and partners in the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, considered to be New Zealand’s ‘founding’ document. Incorporating several Third Way-style initiatives, the ‘Closing the Gaps’ strategy introduced in June 2000 explicitly targeted Māori in the social policy arena. The political fallout that followed, which led Labour-Alliance to argue that it aimed to ‘close’ the socio-economic ‘gaps’ between all included and excluded peoples, highlighted some of the difficulties that arise when the differing conceptual foundations of two socio-political projects (indigenous self-determination and social inclusion) are conflated by governments (see Humpage 2003).

The above historical analysis has indicated that interpretations of social exclusion and inclusion have been interpreted has shifted over time and place. It is important to consider these differences and the contexts in which they exist, but it is also possible to suggest that the concept of social exclusion has been concerned with several key ‘problems’ and that in aiming for social inclusion a number of main ‘solutions’ have been offered. I do not wish to suggest that every government utilising a social

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1 The Labour-Alliance coalition government was in power from late 1999 to 2002. Although largely constituted of the same politicians, the current government is a Labour-Progressive coalition (Jim Anderton, the leader of the Alliance Party, left to form the Progressive Party but has retained his position as a key coalition partner). The focus of this paper is largely on the period of Labour-Alliance’s term, although it is argued that very little has changed in terms of the policy focus for Māori since 2002.
inclusion/discourse has adopted each definition offered below, but simply wish to convey the boundaries of such discourse.

**Defining the limits of social inclusion/exclusion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exclusion</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of social insurance</td>
<td>Government support for the uninsured</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poverty and deprivation</td>
<td>Social investment</td>
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<td>The rising cost of the welfare state</td>
<td>Mutual obligation requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poor labour market attachment</td>
<td>Labour market attachment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poor economic performance</td>
<td>Link social policy to economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Behaviour of individuals</td>
<td>Coercion and conformity</td>
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<td>(welfare dependency)</td>
<td>Social cohesion</td>
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As the table above demonstrates, an artificial boundary between the ‘socially excluded’ and ‘included’ lies at the heart of a social inclusion/exclusion discourse, resulting in each being regarded as a polar-opposite yet homogenous group: the excluded (an ‘underclass’ with a shared, marginalized and often pathological culture) and the included, who are portrayed as a cohesive group that is well-integrated into society (and, importantly, paid work) but whose characteristics are rather more hazy. There are some general problems with this polarization.

First, if we understand social inclusion as a multi-dimensional concept, as it has been conceived at points in its history, it is possible to argue that some individuals show signs of ‘inclusion’ on one level (for example, integration with a cultural community or volunteer work), while at the same time facing severe exclusion (such as unemployment) on a different level. In addition, the polarisation of social inclusion and exclusion fail to acknowledge regular movement back and forth between the poles of inclusion and exclusion by a particular individual or group. It is difficult to tell whether the emphasis on paid work in New Zealand and elsewhere is a cause or effect of this tendency to regard inclusion or exclusion as mutually exclusive, but certainly this focus has encouraged such an assumption.

Second, conceiving of inclusion/exclusion as binary opposites also ignores structural power relations associated with, for example, ‘race’, ethnicity, gender, age, sexual orientation and disability, which influence the lives of both the included and excluded
and interact to create particular circumstances and specific conditions for membership of the ‘social’ (Taylor 1996:3). Indeed, the polarisation of social inclusion and exclusion masks the degrees of inequality amongst the 80% or so who are ‘included’. In addition, Bowring (2000:308) states that, in conceiving of poverty and disadvantage as a pathological deviation from what is essentially fair and harmonious social organisation rather than symptoms of capitalism, a social inclusion/exclusion discourse encourages us to think about deprivation and inequality as peripheral phenomena occurring at the margins of society. The forms of domination that structure the lives of the excluded and included alike are thus largely ignored.

Lister (2001:425) notes that an emphasis on ‘what works’ (evidence-based policy) in social policy has enabled Third Way governments to avoid a direct assault on structural inequalities. As a result, “while ‘joined up government’ explicitly acknowledges that individual problems cannot be solved in isolation from each other, the solution is managerial rather than political: the breaking down of departmental boundaries rather than of structural divisions, when both are needed” (Lister 2001:433). Inequalities are thus reduced to a series of individual problems, faced by particular groups of individuals, such as the unemployed, lone mothers or, in the New Zealand case, Māori (Lister 2001:?). It could be argued that initiatives based on this form of social inclusion can, therefore, have only very limited impact because the overall focus is not on the causes but on the effects of exclusion and, increasingly, the behaviour of individuals who are deemed to be excluded. Inadequate focus has been placed on the means by which the ‘mainstream’ of society generates social exclusion, as further discussion in relation to Māori demonstrates (Burden and Hamm 2000:193;197).

A lack of interest in broader power relations reflects a shift away from the traditional social-democratic on achieving equality (Lister 2001:431). Giddens (1998:65), one of the intellectual foundations behind Third Way thinking in Britain, has noted that equality and redistribution are still important, but that the focus should be on the ‘redistribution of possibilities’ to alleviate human potential. In this way, acknowledgement of diversity is framed by a sort of ‘equal opportunities’ discourse which is constructed around the problem of how to enable ‘them’ (‘the different’) to overcome barriers that prevent them from becoming like ‘us’ (‘the normal’) (Powell 2000:48). Opportunity in this sense is associated with education, training and paid work, rather than the redistribution of income through the tax-benefit system (Lister 1998:217). The notion of equality of outcomes (or equity) appears to have been lost in the social inclusion/exclusion discourse, particularly in New Zealand, Australia and Great Britain where a focus on paid work dominates. This is because, as Powell (2000:49) notes of Blair’s government, “differences are treated as a matter to be reconciled through the normal and ‘normalizing’ identity of being a wage earner. Waged work is no longer reserved for white, able-bodied males: anyone can (and should) be a breadwinner”. As a result, issues of racism or gender have been dealt with separately rather than explicitly as part of the inclusion agenda which is purported to be ‘colour-blind’ (Lister 1998:217; Burden and Hamm 2000:195-196).

These criticisms of social inclusion/exclusion clearly support an argument that this discourse is problematic for all minority identity groups, but it is important not to assume that those categorised as excluded experience exclusion in the same way and that the application of a social inclusion/exclusion discourse has the same impact or
raises the same conceptual tensions for all groups. Indigenous peoples, in particular, have unique and significant needs and rights that set them apart from other ethnic or cultural groups which make the application of the concepts of social inclusion/exclusion particularly problematic in their case. Given the ‘fuzziness’ of social inclusion/exclusion and the multiple meanings it supports, it is important when making such an assertion to be very careful in identifying which interpretation of social inclusion/exclusion to which one refers. This paper thus focuses on the rather limited conceptions of inclusion/exclusion that have been articulated by the Labour-Alliance coalition government elected to power in November 1999 which sit in tension with indigenous self-determination as promoted by Māori. Some of the arguments made here may well be pertinent to indigenous peoples living in other settler societies; however, in contending that social policy discourses must better account for the varied socio-political contexts in which they are applied, it is not possible to assume that this is always the case. Certainly the way in which political rhetoric about social inclusion/exclusion has intersected with a legal and moral discourse concerning the Treaty of Waitangi cannot have been replicated elsewhere.

**INEQUALITIES IN INDIGENOUS-STATE RELATIONS**

It is contended that one of the most serious problems with the application of a social inclusion/exclusion discourse results from little differentiation being made between the varied peoples who have been categorized as ‘excluded’. This ignores the specific power relations that exist between particular ‘excluded’ groups and the state. In the New Zealand context, tensions between the history of dispossession and assimilation that Māori have experienced and the rights they hold as indigenous peoples and Treaty partners has resulted in growing recognition of Māori by government as a ‘special case’. Yet, New Zealand governments have remained cautious about making the space for Māori to exercise greater self-determination when it is likely to impinge on its own authority or threaten the state’s legitimacy.

For many Māori, therefore, the core ‘problem’ to be resolved by social policy is not that of social exclusion, but the continuing inequalities in the power held by Māori and the state. Indeed, it could be argued that ‘social exclusion’ is just one of many symptoms of these unequal power relations, rather than the core ‘problem’ itself. Certainly, the disproportionate levels of unemployment that Māori experience, which according to the Labour-Alliance government in New Zealand, are a key characteristic of social exclusion, cannot be separated from the effects of Māori dispossession from their lands and resources. It is thus difficult to conceive of the economist’s usual toolkit being likely to produce the innovative polices necessary to deal directly with these root causes of Māori ‘social exclusion’ as defined by their lack of paid work (see Hunter 2000:vi).

While New Zealand governments have increasingly acknowledged the state’s role in Māori dispossession and exploitation through the Treaty of Waitangi claims settlement process, the relevance of indigenous and Treaty rights to social policy has not been adequately endorsed (see Barrett and Connolly-Stone 1998). The Closing the Gaps strategy initially appeared to be a significant response to Labour-Alliance’s identification of the specific and unequal power relations between Māori and the state.
Māori capacity building initiatives were implemented across government and an attempt was made to enhance government performance for Māori by improving reporting procedures and government ability to produce evidence-based policy. In addition, greater Māori participation and representation was encouraged, particularly in the health sector. This explicit focus on Māori produced a public backlash against the policy strategy led by Opposition members and the media because some members of Labour-Alliance promoted the Closing the Gaps strategy with reference to Māori self-determination and the Treaty of Waitangi.

Such a backlash was unwarranted, however, because the Closing the Gaps strategy was the Labour-Alliance government’s first practical implementation of a much broader social inclusion agenda. This was clear from the way in which some initiatives of the policy strategy targeted Pacific peoples, a multi-dimensional population group that grew out of waves of migration from islands in the Pacific during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Targeting Pacific as well as Māori peoples made sense from the perspective of a social inclusion/exclusion discourse, because both ethnic groups share similar levels of socio-economic exclusion, including rates of unemployment. However, such a move ignored the impact of colonization upon Māori and the historical and the ongoing assimilation, exploitation and systemic discrimination they continue to face. Pacific peoples and other ethnic and cultural groups have, of course, suffered structural and historical discrimination in New Zealand, but unlike Māori they do not constitute an ‘internally colonised’ peoples who can claim the right to self-determination based on their inherent rights as ‘first peoples’ and their international legal rights as signatories to the Treaty of Waitangi. Yet, a brief analysis of capacity building suggests that this policy initiative, like others aiming to improve social inclusion, was based on conceptual foundations that did not adequately account for the unique status of Māori.

‘Capacity building’

Capacity building is one of the key policy ‘solutions’ in the social inclusion repertoire. In New Zealand, this policy tool has largely involved central government providing funding to community level organisations so as to build their infrastructural and organisational capacity. The articulated goal behind the building of community capacity has been ‘community empowerment’. This has been a key concern of Third Way social policy because it reflects the trend for social-democratic governments to be “struggling away from being a traditional social-democratic party where the state is the mechanism for doing things to saying the state is a facilitator of people doing things for themselves” (Maharey 2001b). While it could be argued that this indicates the abandonment of the people by the state, Third Way governments like the Labour-Alliance coalition have recognised that communities are sites of relevant knowledge regarding local needs and capability, as well as having the flexibility to meet diverse needs and the motivation to mobilise resources and energy far beyond that commercial self-interest and government regulation can achieve (Harris and Eichbaum 1999:234-235). Advocating a revival of ‘civil society’, the Labour-Alliance government wished to build ‘social capital’ by promoting partnerships between the state sector, business, local government and the wider community. It was hoped that local communities would reach a level of ‘self-determination’ where they could solve local problems (see Clark 2000; 2001; Maharey 2001a).
Capacity building initiatives were developed across the government sector in New Zealand following the 1999 election, but specific funding ($113 million over four years) was put into those targeting Māori (Horomia 2000:1). While these were clearly beneficial for the Māori organisations and communities that received resources for capacity assessment and building, the initiatives were largely about improving the efficiency and effectiveness of government-funded social services by providing limited lump sums to the Māori organisations or communities who were providing or wished to provide them. Māori capacity building was thus limited in its scope and largely ignored the political aims of the Māori communities funded (see Humpage 2003).

This is not surprising given the conceptual understandings behind the ‘community empowerment’ motive which drove capacity building. Servian (1996:5-7;12) has noted that the term ‘empowerment’ can be defined in numerous (often contradictory) ways, but it often refers to those in authority giving power to or meeting the needs of those who are powerless. Implying that communities are in ‘deficit’ and need to have power invested in them to discourage social exclusion, the goal of empowerment thus complemented the way in which Māori have traditionally been conceived by New Zealand governments as culturally lacking (see James 1999:20). Founded upon a model of community empowerment, capacity building may thus be viewed as an example of the government sector giving Māori communities ‘permission’ to assume greater responsibilities (and accountabilities) for meeting their own needs, without threatening the political status quo.

Yet Māori, when asserting their rights to self-determination, have emphasised that they already hold power (as ‘first peoples’ and through Article Two of the Māori-language Treaty2), although they readily concede that their ability to exercise it has been diminished. Self-determination is a multi-dimensional concept and Māori individuals, tribal groups and non-tribal configurations have proposed a variety of means through which tino rangatiratanga (the power to be self-determining) might be expressed. However, calls for greater government recognition of this existing power through the transferral of authority and control over decision-making and resources are widespread. This would involve potentially significant structural changes within existing institutional arrangements at the local, regional and ‘national’ levels.

There might, therefore, be some overlap in the actual activities engaged in as a means to community empowerment and Māori self-determination but it is clear that the philosophies behind the two outcomes are significantly different (see Jenkins and Jones 2000:139). For, as Loomis (2000:22, emphasis in the original) noted at the time: “Government’s current capacity building initiative seems to recognise the importance of Māori self-determination, but not the strategic difference between government reducing disparities and Māori achieving their own development through self-governance”. Based on the goal of social inclusion, Labour-Alliance’s approach to capacity building was not only conceptually inappropriate for Māori, it was inconsistent with the political rhetoric that surrounded this initiative. For instance, the Minister of Māori Affairs, Parekura Horomia (2000:1) rather grandly promoted

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2 There are both English- and Māori-language versions of the Treaty of Waitangi, which provide inconsistent translations of the three articles contained within the document. The three articles are explained on page 12 of this paper.
capacity building as a “new era of partnership” in Māori development and as having “the potential to reshape New Zealand as we know it” (Horomia cited in Te Puni Kokiri 2000:1). That this was not really the goal of Labour-Alliance’s social policy becomes very clear in the next section which deals with the concept of ‘partnership’.

‘Partnership’

Another key concept employed by Third Way governments in their pursuit of social inclusion has been ‘partnership’. Although this term usually suggests that equals are involved in a mutually supportive dialogue (Morton and Gibson 2003:9), this is not what has been discussed in relation to social inclusion. Indeed, partnership in this context referred simply to the government sector “supporting stronger communities for the shaping and local co-ordination of the delivery of services” and “greater community say in the design and delivery of policy and services” (Maharey 2000:7; see MOSP 2001a). Once again, this was justified on the basis that communities are best able to identify and provide the kinds of services they need and that harnessing their strength will build social capital and, as a result, civil society (Maharey 2001b:1).

In defining partnership as a functional means with which to achieve improved outcomes (greater social inclusion), the Labour-Alliance coalition conflated it with participation (see Morton and Gibson 2003:1-5). One example was found in the way Labour-Alliance legislated that every District Health Board (which govern the country’s hospitals) was legally bound to provide two guaranteed positions for Māori representatives. This was promoted in terms of the Treaty and of ‘partnership’, suggesting that significant power had been conceded to Māori. However, in regarding participation, having a ‘voice’ or being represented within a decentralised administrative or management context as power, the Labour-Alliance government appeared to regard power as if it can be measured and distributed by the state, rather than regarded as a set of relations between groups in society (see Servian 1996:13; James 1999:13-14). Iris Marion Young (1990:31-32) argues that because power is a relation, not a thing, it cannot be distributed. While exercise of power may sometimes depend on the possession of certain resources, the resources are not in themselves power. Rather, power consists of a relationship between the exercisers and those over whom power is being exercised. Regarding power as a commodity to be distributed misses the structural phenomena of the domination and oppression that Māori experience. Thus, although the two guaranteed positions for Māori on each of the twenty-one District Health Boards were a significant measure, they failed to account for the fact that such representatives are not likely to exercise power within a context that, in all other respects, reflects majority group values and norms.

In addition, in extending the notion of partnership across all communities, Labour-Alliance marginalised the understandings of partnership that have been articulated by indigenous peoples, who have often been equated it with a power-sharing relationship that reflects the equal, sovereign status of both indigenous peoples and the state. In New Zealand, the term partnership resonates with even deeper meaning because Māori have long argued that Article Two of the Māori-language version of the Treaty of Waitangi indicates that Māori rights to self-determination were never extinguished and that the Treaty was intended as the basis for an ongoing partnership between
Māori and the state. New Zealand governments since the mid-1980s have increasingly accepted that, even though there may not have been a partnership as such at the original signing of the Treaty, it seems clear that Māori signatories were keen to establish a working relationship with the British Queen and her people (Durie 1991:157). While the question of how and to what degree such a partnership might be expressed remained under debate at the end of the twentieth century, the rhetoric used by the Labour Party before the 1999 election and in early promotion of the Closing the Gaps strategy suggested that the Labour-Alliance government endorsed an understanding of partnership with Māori that went beyond Third Way understandings of community consultation or participation.

Nonetheless, it is argued that the Labour-Alliance coalition provided no significant shift in thinking in the area of partnership, despite frequent reference to the Treaty. It is important to note that there are both English- and Māori-language versions of the Treaty of Waitangi, each consisting of three articles. Article Two of the Māori-language Treaty guaranteed Māori the continuing possession of ‘tino rangatiratanga’ (in this case, autonomy and control over all things Māori) in balance with the ‘kāwanatanga’ (governance) granted to the British Crown in Article One. This article is commonly interpreted by contemporary Māori to indicate that their rights to self-determination were not extinguished and that the signing chiefs expected to continue governing themselves, although they did cede to the British Crown the right to govern all present and future colonists. In the English-language Treaty, however, the term ‘kāwanatanga’ in Article One was translated as ‘sovereignty’. This suggested that the British Crown alone held the power to govern, limiting the notion of tino rangatiratanga to a form of property rights. A third article, which was much the same in both the Māori- and English-language treaties, guaranteed Māori equal rights as British citizens.

It is Article Three that was the focus of Labour-Alliance’s interest in the Treaty. By positioning Māori as equal citizens rather than sovereign peoples, the government could be seen to be fulfilling its obligations as a Treaty partner, while at the same time demonstrating the limits of government’s engagement with Māori. This approach conceptualised Māori as just another disadvantaged and excluded group of citizens, marginalising Māori calls for the development of governance relationships that reflected a more equal understanding of partnership. As the following section highlights, this is because the notion of social inclusion normalises the ‘included’, promoting the values and norms of the majority group and encouraging minority groups to conform through coercive measures.

NORMALISING THE ‘INCLUDED’

It has been noted that a social inclusion/exclusion discourse’s preoccupation with the ‘excluded’ and their behaviour has led to the excluded being regarded as on the periphery of society, allowing little attention to be paid to the ‘included’ who are situated at the centre (see Smith 1999:53). Yet, the concept of social exclusion implies exclusion from something. In New Zealand, this has typically been participation in those activities that are portrayed as ‘normal’ or ‘desirable’ but in fact reflect the
dominant norms of an often unidentified cultural majority. In this way, a social inclusion/exclusion discourse normalises the values and norms of the majority culture and constructs the excluded as ‘other’ to a poorly defined group categorised as ‘included’ (see Lister 2001:431). Without being clear about what inclusion is, who defines it and who creates its rules and parameters, a inclusion/exclusion discourse, naturalises or normalises the cultural majority and thus redoubles its hegemony (Peace 2001:33).

This section provides New Zealand examples which demonstrate the effects a lack of conceptual interrogation into the culture of inclusion and the exact nature of the social from which individuals and groups are excluded can have on indigenous peoples such as Māori (see McLaren 1994:59; Taylor 1996:3). First, given that the concepts of social inclusion/exclusion grew out of a continental European context, it is argued that social inclusion provides yet another example of culturally-specific assumptions that reflect western liberal traditions being applied to Māori at the expense of their own cultural traditions. To illustrate this point, the notion of social capital and the western biases that it reflects is discussed, emphasising conceptual tensions that exist between Māori and majority group understandings of family, community and obligation. Second, consideration is given to the way in which a discourse of inclusion/exclusion, when normalising the dominant majority group and their values, encourages (in some cases through coercion) conformity with the cultural and moral norms of the so-called ‘included’.

‘Social capital’

To illustrate the way in which the culturally-specific assumptions of social inclusion/exclusion fail to account for other cultural traditions, one needs only to consider the notion of social capital, a lack of which is commonly understood to contribute to social exclusion. Putnam (1993), one of the key proponents of social capital, defines it in terms of four features of communities: the existence of community networks; civic engagement or participation in community networks; a sense of community identity, solidarity and equality with other community members; and norms of trust and reciprocal help and support (Percy-Smith 2000:6-7). Networks of civic engagement are thus considered essential forms of social capital and it is expected that the more extensive these networks are, the more likely members of a community are to cooperate for mutual benefit (Hunter 2000:4).

Influenced by the work of Putnam and Fukuyama, who do not so much value community integration in its own right but due to the economic advantages it is supposed to engender (Midgley 2001:162; Little 2002:22-23), the Labour-Alliance government allocated resources to community projects, particularly those likely to demonstrate a rate of economic return (see Midgley 2001:163). The goal of social inclusion did not represent an explicit desire on the part of the coalition government to extinguish Māori culture; in fact, there was explicit support for its retention (see Labour Party 1999e:1-3). The common refrain that social cohesion and inclusion were necessary as an “essential building block for a growing and innovative economy” (Clark 2002:10) suggested that a kind of corporate assimilation, likely to enhance Māori integration into the mainstream and – more importantly, the global – economy, was a key pursuit. It is acknowledged that Māori have no doubt benefited
from the funding of social policy initiatives, such as capacity building, that aimed to build social capital. Yet, in promoting the development of networks that are created outside the family through a wide range of community associations, the concept of social capital demonstrates that concepts based on Eurocentric understandings of ‘family’ and ‘community’ are not necessarily applicable to Māori.

For example, families are considered important to social capital, but there is a fear that if they become too strong, they may crowd out the weaker ties of the community (Hunter 2000:33). Indeed, the aim of building social capital and trust is to overcome these ‘cultural defects’ found in some communities (see Little 2002:111). This is problematic when the concept is applied to Māori, because kin-based relationships – through iwi (tribe), hapū (clan or sub-tribe) and whānau (extended family) - are the predominant (although in contemporary times, not the only) basis for Māori social organisations. Robinson and Williams (2001:55) note that the conceptual separation of family from community that social capital promotes is problematic when applied to Māori society, where the concept of family moves seamlessly from the immediate family to the wider family network and the tribe, where the (extended) family becomes the community and the community is made up of the (extended) family. Thus, in the Māori context, the distinction between cultural and social capital disappears. These nuances were not, however, identified by the New Zealand politicians who embraced Third Way politics.

In addition, the way in which reciprocity and obligation have been conceptualised as means with which to encourage social inclusion sits in tension with Māori understandings of these concepts. Attempts to build social capital in New Zealand have largely been through formal, rule-driven obligations (for instance, in regards to social security payments) that aim to integrate socially excluded individuals within formal organisations and networks. Notions of obligation and reciprocity are incredibly important within Māori society; indeed, the assimilationist policies of the past have required Māori to draw on their store of social capital to address the impact of these programmes and to sustain themselves in the face of the challenges that arose out of such policy. However, because they are not formalised or written down, community activities based on cultural obligation are not immediate and cannot be specified as a condition of involvement in Māori society. This is because relationships in Māori society usually develop around informal associations, where the holistic, integrating nature of relationships and networks are of primary importance and the use or functional activity secondary in significance (Robinson and Williams 2001:56-60).

In making the implicit assumption that the socially excluded lack these networks and obligations and by defining obligations in terms of attachment to the labour market, the Labour-Alliance government’s desire to build social capital ignored a whole range of activities that may not relate directly to paid employment and thus failed to recognise the existence and value of alternative modes of social integration and solidarity outside exchange relations (Bowring 2000:308). For example, research has demonstrated that Māori individuals, particularly Māori women, engage in greater levels of voluntary work than their non-Māori counterparts even when narrow, culturally-biased definitions of ‘voluntary work’ are applied (see Butler 2000:25-26). Thus, disadvantaged Māori do not necessarily lack social networks in general, but lack what government considers to be ‘useful’ networks; that is, those that enable those receiving social security payments to find jobs (Hunter 2000:6).
This narrow understanding of obligation is highly troubling, because little attention was paid to the way in which some forms of employment (such as casual or seasonal work that involves or leads to frequent movement of the workforce) may actually diminish the extent of shared values and trust that are seen as contributing to social capital, because they uproot the worker’s family and thus weaken their links to the local community. The relationship between social capital and unemployment is not simple, therefore, even in a mono-cultural context (Hunter 2000:v). When you add the cultural and spiritual significance that some Māori place upon traditional lands and locations, this relationship is strained ever more. Nor has recognition been made that state interventions into Māori family life may have, over a period of decades, removed the cultural foundations upon which social capital grew and the trust that social capital theory suggests is necessary to make economic gains (see Hunter 2000:34). Indeed, Māori might argue that the rebuilding of Māori trust in the state should be marked as a first priority.

In defining obligation in such a narrow manner, New Zealand governments have also ignored the fact that it is possible to have social capital while at the same time being unemployed and/or disadvantaged on different levels of the social exclusion matrix. Indeed, many communities are essentially associations of individuals and groups with common interests that are not active within the sphere of economic activity, but may indeed provide a space where people protected from the pervasive economic rationality (Little 2002:22-23). Regarding a job as essential to people’s sense of social worth and usefulness, the discourse of social inclusion thus itself becomes exclusionary and a reward for socially adaptive behaviour and attitudes (Bowring 2000:310;320-24). The following section indicates that this is due to the moral integration and social cohesion agendas that lie behind the social inclusion/exclusion discourse.

‘Active citizenship’

It was noted earlier that a common characteristic of a social inclusion/exclusion discourse in English-speaking policy contexts was its concern with social and moral cohesion. Any liberal-democracy necessarily has an interest in societal cohesion, which concerns the unity and solidarity between the individuals who constitute the citizenry of the state. For example, a sense of common identity and membership is essential for generating the kind of solidarity required to support the redistribution of resources through the welfare-state (Kymlicka 2001:26). However, the coercive measures introduced by Third Way governments to encourage the social security recipients into the labour market have not targeted the entire population evenly. There has been little concern that the elderly, for example, are usually situated outside the labour market. This is because, Burden and Hamm (2000:194) argue, they are not seen as a threat to social order or the moral consensus and thus social cohesion.

The western liberal values – social responsibility, social unity, democracy etc – that are considered to be under threat and are thus mustered and affirmed by a social inclusion/exclusion discourse are hard to challenge, because they give expression to our wish to belong and appeal to a common perception of what is right, good and valuable (Harris and Williams 2003:211). The problem arises, Harris and Williams
(2003:211-212) note, when supposed threats to these values are linked to particular persons and practices and, through them, to signifiers such as race, religion and country of origin. This provides a link between fear, identity and social inclusion, because identity is what provides the reference point for determining ‘what is right, good or valuable’. These things are usually determined by drawing comparisons and emphasising differences within or between individuals and groups.

It was noted earlier that the polarisation of social inclusion and exclusion was highly problematic for Māori because it ignores differences and similarities found between those included and excluded. However, the moral implications of polarisation are also relevant to Māori and other indigenous peoples because, as Jonathon Rutherford (cited in McLaren 1994:60) has noted:

Binarism operates in the same way as splitting and projection: the center expels its anxieties, contradictions and irrationalities onto the subordinate term, filling it with the antithesis of its own identity; the Other, in its very alienness, simply mirrors and represents what is deeply familiar to the center, but project outside of itself. It is in these very processes and representations of marginality that the violence, antagonisms and aversions which are the core of the dominant discourses and identities become manifest – racism, homophobia, misogyny and class contempt are the products of this frontier.

Most people would agree that citizens should have access to adequate housing, as well as a reasonable level of income and health care, but there is less agreement as to the level of provision or the terms and conditions governing the provision of goods and services (Percy-Smith 2000:15). This is where moral agendas come into play, resulting in a discourse of social inclusion/exclusion that targets the behaviour of the excluded. Behind this discourse is a belief that there exists a set of universal values which, if all individuals were to adopt it, would provide the possibility for social renewal and relief from social division. Like other policy discourses that construct a theoretical vision of what an ‘ideal’ (inclusive) society might look like in the future, the concepts of social inclusion/exclusion make no acknowledgment that, even in the 21st century when difference is widely acknowledged, certain voices tend to endure and dominate and the achievement of such a goal requires that minority group citizens meet majority group terms (Dwyer 1998:496; Hunter 2000:25).

In New Zealand, the explicit targeting of Māori through the Closing the Gaps strategy resulted in a public backlash that was clearly a moral attack against this ethnic group and against government policies focused on it. However, a social inclusion/exclusion discourse may be conceived as a moral assault on indigenous peoples more generally when we consider that indigenous peoples are disproportionately represented amongst social security recipients and people in poverty (Daly and Smith 2002:2). They consequently make up the majority of those categorized as ‘socially excluded’, resulting in their moral behaviour and cultural traditions being put under the microscope as government’s in settler states have adopted a social inclusion/exclusion discourse. This level of analysis is not new, for a high level of welfare dependence has traditionally legitimized the increased government involvement in and control of indigenous people’s lives, to the extent that Arthur (2002:1) characterises it as a form ‘welfare colonialism’.
This emphasis on the moral and social cohesion has been particularly problematic for indigenous peoples due to the way in which a social inclusion/exclusion discourse has been tied to national identity and citizenship. Harris and Williams (2003:205) argue that social inclusion operates through an appeal to the ‘moral imagination’ in that it indicates how participatory relations ought to operate, based more on moral preferences than logical, careful calculations of economic costs and benefits (Harris and Williams 2003:208). This is troublesome not only because it is then questionable whether social inclusion can ever actually be measured or determined to be actually or materially present (Harris and Williams 2003:208), but also because such moral preferences are based on culturally-specific assumptions that do not reflect the values or goals of individuals and groups outside the majority culture.

Many commentators (Dwyer 1998; McMillan 2002) have noted the way in which social security recipients and others are obligated to adopt particular moral or social behaviours in order to receive payments, reflects a shift away from understandings welfare as a right of citizenship to seeing citizenship conditional on meeting such obligations (Harris and Williams 2003:205). Following three decades of increasing recognition of ‘difference’ and ‘diversity’, any individual can potentially belong to a society, but belonging is conditional on adherence to a national identity based on the core values of the dominant group. It is assumed that these values are shared and that paid employment and the nuclear family are acceptable norms to which individuals can be expected to conform. This high degree of moral conformity, of course, runs counter to the supposed wide-ranging acceptance of ‘difference’ (Burden and Hamm 2000:192-193).

The transformation of citizenship into something that is conditional rather than based on human or social rights is highly problematic in a general sense. Writing in the New Zealand context, McMillan (2002:2-3) indicates that social inclusion/exclusion has placed less interest on the kinds of rights attached to citizenship and more focus on the right kind of citizen, with social rights being reduced to labour market opportunities. This is what Robert Plant (cited in Merkel 2001:53) refers to as ‘supply side citizenship’, where the onus is on an active state to establish the basic conditions necessary to access the labour market, but then individuals are obligated to responsibly utilize these opportunities through participation in the workforce or through social capital building that will make their participation more likely. Citizenship has thus become conditional for those at the bottom of the socio-economic heap, while no such obligations have been placed on those at the top to be ‘active citizens’ in the same way, nor have they been regarded as second-order citizens if they failed to participate in the ways thought appropriate. (see Lister 2001:438; Dwyer 1998:498).

Given that New Zealand government have traditionally situated debate about Māori and social policy within a citizenship discourse (as correlated with Article Three), the increasingly conditional nature of it is highly troublesome because it limits the ability of Māori to improve their socio-economic status when compared to non-Māori New Zealanders. Even more concerning, however, is the way in which social inclusion marginalises calls for Article Two of the Māori-language version of the Treaty to be implemented because it cannot conceive of self-exclusion as an option.
ACCOUNTING FOR SELF-EXCLUSION

In the context of the welfare system in New Zealand, the intolerant attitudes towards and punitive treatment of those who are considered to be deviant or non-conforming have meant that ‘voluntary self-exclusion’ is regarded as a social problem and thus a legitimate target for punitive action (Percy-Smith 2000:20). Although purported to promote ‘self-reliance’ and ‘independence’, such welfare initiatives do not, therefore, allow for much degree of individual choice. Yet, there are several reasons why an individual might choose to strategically self-exclude themselves from such a regime. For example, while there may be some social security recipients who simply prefer welfare dependency to paid work, there appears to be little recognition that the price of an individual’s inclusion into what Bowring (2000:316) calls the ‘culture of capitalist consumerism’ may result in exclusion from their family, due to working long hours and/or developing the ‘addictions and compulsions of captive consumers’. Nor has there been recognition that some individuals may not want to accord with a particular ‘excluded’ identity (for example, homeless addicts) and thus become excluded from the notion of exclusion itself (Peace 2001:32; Bowring 2000:314). Self-exclusion can therefore result in individuals using non-participation as a political choice or because they come from a non-participatory culture, due to a lack of information and knowledge, alienation from political institutions and processes, or because they do not feel they have a stake in society and the way it is governed (Percy-Smith 2000:151).

In focusing on Māori in New Zealand, it is important to draw attention to the way in which individuals may be socially excluded from either mainstream society or their own group, for both forms of social exclusion result in different, often opposing, behavioural responses (Hunter 2000:2). Indeed, self-exclusion from mainstream society may be an assertion of the positive value of a particular, encapsulated culture, particularly those of indigenous peoples which have frequently been constructed according to their difference from the mainstream colonising culture (Hunter 2000:4). According to this line of thinking, Māori may choose not to actively seek employment in mainstream labour market because this empowers them to hunt, fish or participate in other cultural customs. These hours of ‘spare’ time may facilitate more extensive participation in ceremonial activities, thus increasing what may be defined in the indigenous context as ‘cultural capital’ (see Hunter 2000:vi).

While individuals choosing their culture over paid work can simply be labelled as ‘undeserving citizens’ by government, self-exclusion at the group level raises far more serious concerns. Like other indigenous peoples living in settler states, Māori have long called for greater self-determination over their own lives and have proposed a range of ways through which this might be achieved. Calls for a separatist exclusion that rests upon a break-away Māori state have been rare, with most Māori realising the impracticality of such a proposal given the high degree of familial and geographical integration between Māori and non-Māori. More commonly, calls for greater self-determination recognise the benefits gained from being part of single, larger state while at the same time proposing a form of ‘strategic exclusion’ that allows greater autonomy for Māori at the local, regional and national levels. It is at this latter, ‘national’ level where Māori have met the most resistance from New
Zealand governments, a fact not altered by Labour-Alliance’s adoption of a social inclusion/exclusion discourse.

I use the term ‘national’ cautiously, because in articulating their desires for greater self-determination by means of strategic exclusion, many indigenous peoples have claimed that they represent distinct ‘nations’ (cultural-political communities) who pre-existed the encompassing settler society and who still, to some extent, form separate communities and political entities, despite their incorporation into a larger ‘state’ (framework of legal, military and political institutions) (Sanders 2002:vii;9). Indeed, the term ‘nations within’ has been coined to highlight that encapsulated indigenous peoples have national values and a political stance that set them apart from other minority groups and to promote recognition that two (or more) equal and autonomous nations can co-exist within the state, each of which is sovereign in its own right but shares societal sovereignty by way of multiple, interlocking jurisdictions (Fleras and Spoonley 1999:237-240). This would lead to what Will Sanders (2002:vii;9-10) calls an indigenous order of government, which he regards as the only philosophically coherent and historically realistic approach to future indigenous affairs policy.

Conceiving of historical and contemporary Māori calls for greater self-determination as forms of nationalism is fraught with ambiguities and exceptions, but a shared culture, language (with minor tribal variations) and history of colonisation certainly has laid for the foundations for assertions of indigenous nationhood at both the tribal or pan-Māori levels (see Durie, 1998, p.228; Fleras and Spoonley, 1999, p.59). The Māori King movement in the 1860s and the establishment of a Māori Parliament in 1890 are two early examples of forms of strategic exclusion based on an indigenous nationalism. More recently, further proposals for a parallel Māori Parliament, bicultural legislatures in the existing Parliament and devolved authority across a range of jurisdictions (including land ownership and management, health, welfare, economic development, law, and education) indicate that many Māori desire a process of power sharing within a common legal and governmental order (see Smith 2002:5-6).

Given that the Declaration of Independence and in Article Two of the Māori-language version of the Treaty of Waitangi acknowledged that Māori constituted a distinct, sovereign peoples with the right to self-determination, New Zealand governments have increasingly recognized the cultural distinctiveness of Māori. Yet, they have at the same time marginalised Māori desires to exercise self-determination at the national level by continuing to promote a form of liberal citizenship that assumes ‘nation’ and ‘state’ are irrevocably tied. This means that any claim to nation status by Māori has been understood by New Zealand governments as posing a risk for the absolute sovereignty of the political state (Pearson 2001a:174; 2001b:5). The social inclusion/exclusion discourse adopted by Labour-Alliance, although providing a reinterpretation of citizenship that focused more on the obligations than rights, made no challenge to these assumptions of liberal theory. Rather, its emphasis on national identity and citizenship was concerned with incorporating Māori and other excluded peoples into the ‘national’ or, as Kymlicka would describe it, ‘societal’ culture, which
is territorially bound by the nation-state and dominates the societal institutions of New Zealand.\(^3\)

The assertion that ‘active citizenship’ involves both obligations and duties has set out the attributes and values of a person or group who truly ‘belongs’ and thus may be considered a ‘real’ citizen. As a result, Māori calling for forms of strategic exclusion from the societal culture are characterized as undeserving citizens. In this way, adoption of a social inclusion/exclusion discourse enabled Labour-Alliance to continue masking the rather dubious means through which the New Zealand nation-state gained its legitimacy, that is the ‘passive revolution’ that occurred with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi (see Brookfield 1999:170-1;183). It is rather ironic that acknowledging and remedying Māori grievances relating to the Treaty, as well as limiting parliamentary supremacy through the accommodation of Māori rights securely within Aotearoa New Zealand’s constitutional structures, would have gone some way to redressing this ‘passive revolution’ of 1840. In failing to address the need for balance between Article One’s kawanatanga (governance) with Article Two’s tino rangatiratanga (power to self-determining), however, the Labour-Alliance government repeated the same mistake made by the Crown in the nineteenth century and by its governmental predecessors in the intervening years. The Labour-Alliance government also failed to actualise an opportunity to restore, at least in the eyes of many Māori, the legitimacy of the state by addressing the fundamental power inequalities between Māori and the state that cause many of the characteristics of exclusion considered so problematic by a Third Way social inclusion/exclusion discourse.

Harris and Williams (2003:212) argue that it is these understandings of national identity and citizenship that have acted as a ‘master narrative’ in the field of social inclusion more generally. Certainly, Anthony Giddens (1998:69), who is often conceived of as the intellectual architect of the Blair government in Britain, has stressed that a Third Way politics is very much about one-nation politics, while Blair promised ‘a nation united, with common purpose, with no one shut out or excluded’” (Harris and Williams 2003:206). However, greater political devolution to Scotland and Wales, who have long expressed nationalist identities of their own (Percy-Smith 2000b:161), was part of the Blair government’s political agenda. This does not appear to have been promoted in terms of the social inclusion/exclusion discourse evident in Britain at the time but it certainly illustrates the importance of developing policy concepts that are specific to each socio-political context.

**Conclusion**

This paper has attempted to highlight some of key reasons why a social inclusion/exclusion discourse is highly problematic when applied to indigenous peoples. Using the example of Māori in New Zealand, it has argued that the goal of social inclusion not only ignores differences and similarities between the ‘excluded’ and ‘included’ categories, but also fails to place sufficient focus on the particular

\(^3\) Kymlicka (2002:25) uses the term ‘societal’ to emphasise that it involves a common language and social institutions, rather than common religious beliefs, family customs, or personal lifestyles.
needs and rights of indigenous peoples. This is particularly troublesome given that indigenous peoples are disproportionately found in the categories of peoples considered to be excluded. Labour-Alliance government initiatives relating to capacity building, partnership, social capital, mutual obligation and active citizenship have been provided as examples to indicate that a social inclusion/exclusion discourse ignores the specific power relations between the state and Māori; promotes and normalizes the cultural norms of the dominant majority; and cannot allow for the ‘strategic exclusion’ of Māori either at the individual or national levels.

The aim of this discussion has been to illustrate the danger of applying so-called ‘universal’ and ‘colourblind’ concepts that have developed out of a culturally-specific context to other societies where these cultural norms may not be appropriate to significant numbers of the population in specific socio-political contexts. The lack of interrogation into the way in which social inclusion/exclusion perpetuates the assimilatory agendas of previous government policy for indigenous peoples is troubling, for Bowring (2000:318) notes that:

The happiness and self-esteem of everyone cannot possibly be achieved by their conformity to the anonymous and unstable norms and expectations of ‘mainstream society’, but will instead be increasingly predicated on their capacity to seize the spaces vacated by the decomposition of that society, and thus on their freedom to replace it with another.

She adds that by describing the unique life-experiences of poor (and in this context, indigenous people) in any terms other than their lack of resources, the social inclusion/exclusion discourse:

… fails to recognize how the distancing of individuals from society’s central regulating institutions can engender new values, practices and patterns of integration which may establish the basis for a critique of and challenge to the dominant model of society (Bowring 2000:322).

Indeed, it could be argued that in the New Zealand case, this is exactly what the adoption of a social inclusion/exclusion aimed to avoid. While government implemented policy initiatives elsewhere appeared to affirm Māori culture and identity, it is clear that the natural extension of such affirmation – the strategic exclusion of Māori from the mainstream institutions that promote the dominant culture – has continued to be marginalized.

As a result, it is argued that general policy concepts such as inclusion/exclusion should not be applied to indigenous peoples without full consideration of and consultation about the implications that such an application may have upon them (see Hunter 2000:28). This is not only because failure to do so contravenes their rights as first peoples and, in the case of Māori, as partners in the Treaty of Waitangi. It is also because the broader goals of social inclusion – relating to social cohesion and solidarity – will never be achieved while governments continue to avoid taking full responsibility for and rectify the political and cultural disruption caused by colonization, as well as the unequal power relations that have stemmed from it (see Hunter 1999:17). Without recognition that this is the key ‘problem’ holding back
indigenous peoples from enjoying the advantages that many non-indigenous peoples enjoy, the ‘solutions’ provided by Third Way governments in settler societies are likely to continue failing to meet their intended goals.
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